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9 MAY 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Overhead Reconnaissance of North Vietnam During a Truce

REFERENCE : a. SAVA Memorandum, dated 7 May 1968  
b. USIB-D-46.4/15 (COMIREX-D-25.3/3), 7 May 1968

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for an explanation of the relationship between the Bundy Committee papers (attached to the SAVA memorandum) and the COMIREX paper on requirements for overhead reconnaissance of North Vietnam during a truce. The recommendations in paragraph 5. have been coordinated with SAVA and the DDS&T.

2. The Bundy papers are intended as background and position papers for guidance of the negotiating team on the broad question of continued overhead reconnaissance during a possible North Vietnam truce. These papers propose that the question of reconnaissance be avoided as part of the negotiations and agreements but do suggest that if North Vietnam raises the issue, the U.S. should indicate its intention to continue to fly reconnaissance missions as a means of monitoring adherence to truce conditions. The Bundy papers contain in Annex D a statement of recommended target coverage which would be required to monitor North Vietnamese activities during a truce. The papers also summarize current U.S. reconnaissance capabilities and address the question of the types of reconnaissance (high-level and low-level) which might be needed to meet the intelligence requirements.

3. The COMIREX paper does not address all of these questions. It is a statement of the national requirements for reconnaissance coverage of North Vietnam under truce conditions. It considers the principal factors affecting detection of any significant attempt by the North Vietnamese to improve their military capabilities. It also identifies types of targets most likely to yield this information and specifies a required frequency of coverage for the target categories and areas.

4. Therefore, Annex D of the Bundy papers and the COMIREX report both express the national needs for intelligence information in order to help police the truce. Because the COMIREX paper is a composite of the judgments of the USIB member agencies, it should be substituted for Annex D of the Bundy papers as the authoritative statement of requirements.

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5. I recommend that you approve the COMIREX report and that it be substituted for Annex D of the Bundy Committee papers. Further, I suggest that you advise the Director to concur in the Bundy Committee papers after the above substitution has been made.

/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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